Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it wrong? by Green, R
Nodal Pricing of Electricity: 
How much does it cost to get it wrong? *  
 
Richard Green  
University of Birmingham 
 
Institute for Energy Research and Policy, 
University of Birmingham, 
Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK 
r.j.green@bham.ac.uk 
 
Economists know how to calculate optimal prices for electricity transmission.  These are 
rarely applied in practice.  This paper develops a thirteen node model of the transmission 
system in England and Wales, incorporating losses and transmission constraints.  It is solved 
with optimal prices, and with uniform prices for demand and for generation, re-dispatching 
when needed to take account of transmission constraints.  Moving from uniform prices to 
optimal nodal prices could raise welfare by 1.3% of the generators’ revenues, and would be 
less vulnerable to market power.  It would also send better investment signals, but create 
politically sensitive regional gains and losses. 
Keywords: Electricity Transmission Pricing, Welfare Losses, Market Power  
JEL: L9 
                                                          
     * Support from the British Engineering and Physical Sciences Social Research Council under the Supergen 
Future Network Technologies consortium (grant GR/S28082/01), and the Leverhulme Trust, through the award 
of a Philip Leverhulme Prize, is gratefully acknowledged.  I would like to thank the University of California 
Energy Institute and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT for their hospitality, 
Nicholas Cordella for dedicated research assistance, and the editor, two anonymous referees, Bart McGuire, 
  
 
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than twenty years, economists have known how to calculate the optimal locational 
prices for electricity.  That knowledge seems to have been ignored by the designers of many 
electricity markets.  Chile, New Zealand and some US markets have adopted the optimal 
system of nodal spot pricing, but all the electricity markets in Europe have adopted much 
simpler systems, and several have no locational pricing at all.  This paper asks how far 
welfare is reduced by the choice of such simpler pricing rules.  In a simplified model of 
England and Wales, representing the industry in 1996/7, it compares prices, profits and 
consumer welfare under a system of nodal prices, uniform prices, and a hybrid in which 
generators face nodal prices but consumers face a uniform price. 
 The first-best price of electricity at each point on a network (node) equals the marginal 
cost of providing electricity at that node.  The electricity must not only be generated, but it 
must also be delivered to that node, taking account of transmission constraints and electrical 
losses.  If transmission constraints are binding, so that the amount of power flowing through a 
line is at the limit which safety allows, then cheap but distant generation may have to be 
replaced with more expensive local generation, in order to reduce power flows.  In the 
constrained area, the optimal price of electricity rises to the marginal cost of the local 
generation, or to the level needed to ration demand to the amount of electricity available.  
Even if there are no constraints, some power will be lost in the transmission system 
(dissipated as heat), and prices should reflect the fact that it is more expensive to provide 
electricity at the far end of a heavily loaded line than close to a power station.  Transmission 
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Congestion Contracts (Hogan, 1992) could be used to hedge spatial price differentials, and to 
help co-ordinate investment.  
 These principles are well-known, but few electricity systems have adopted them.  
Chile, New Zealand and a small number of US power pools have markets which are based 
upon nodal spot prices, which was also proposed in the Federal Energy Regulation 
Commission’s Standard Market Design, but almost every other country in the world uses a 
simplified system of transmission pricing.  Nodes may be grouped together into zones, and 
the price differentials between zones are calculated from simplified models.  Other systems 
still see transmission as an “overhead” cost, and use simple “wheeling rates” to calculate 
payments if one company imports power from a second over the lines of a third.  These 
payments are typically based upon the volume of the flow and the length of its contracted 
route (the MW-mile approach), and frequently ignore the fact that any transaction in an 
interconnected system will affect power flows on all the other networks in that system.   
Green (1997) discusses the pricing rules then adopted in eight electricity systems, assessing 
them against economic and political criteria.  One common theme was that these rules tended 
to produce lower price differentials than would be associated with optimal spot prices.  
 How important are the differences between the relatively simple rules adopted in 
practice, and the prices which an optimal system would produce?  One of the main economic 
functions of a price system is to signal the opportunity cost of alternative courses of action.  
On the demand side, an agent should buy something if it is valued at more than its price, 
while a supplier should produce it if this can be done for less than its price.   If buyers and 
suppliers face the same prices, their independent decisions will ensure that the value of output 
at the margin is just equal to its marginal cost, which is optimal.  If prices are above marginal 
costs, then too little of a good will be consumed and produced, while too much will be 
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produced if prices are below marginal costs.1  The wrong prices can also lead to inefficient 
“bypass” as agents have an incentive to leave the market, and arrange deals at prices closer to 
their costs.2 
 This paper takes a simplified model of the electrical system in England and Wales, 
calculates optimal prices and quantities, and compares the outcomes with those that simpler 
rules would produce.  The model has thirteen nodes, with demand at every node and 
generation at most of them.  It is solved for different levels of demand, and of generator 
availability, and a weighted sum of the results is used to give the impact over a year as a 
whole.  In particular, we measure average prices, generators’ profits, and the change in 
consumer surplus relative to the first-best case.  We also look at way in which the 
geographical pattern of prices responds to the pricing rules.  
 Green (1994) used a similar model to examine changes in the total cost of generation 
once transmission losses were reflected in the dispatch, but ignored transmission constraints.  
Bialek et al. (2003) report on a similar study undertaken for the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry on the impact of introducing zonal losses charging across Great Britain.  Macatangay 
(1998) takes account of constraints (but not losses) and calculates the price for each zone on 
the NGC system as the dual value in a power flow optimization.  Ilic et al (1997) use a 
detailed model of New England to show how the payments for seven hypothetical wheeling 
transactions would change between three different cost allocation rules.  None of these papers 
studies the impact of spatial pricing on demand.  This paper incorporates demand responses 
in a model which takes account of both losses and transmission constraints.  An earlier 
                                                          
1   This is a slight simplification.  When there are several goods, slightly too much of one good may be produced, 
even though its price is above marginal cost, because other prices are further away from costs. 
2  We will return to this issue in the conclusions. 
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version carried out a similar study (Green, 1998), but reported the results only for 
representative hours.  
 This paper also studies the interaction of market power and transmission pricing.  In 
electricity networks, the exercise of market power can take counter-intuitive forms: it may 
involve increasing output at some locations, in order to tighten a transmission constraint and 
raise prices elsewhere (Cardell et. al. (1997)).  Borenstein et al (2000) show how small 
increases in transmission capacity can lead to significant reductions in market power, once 
congesting a link becomes unattractive.  Oren (1997) suggests that actively traded contracts 
could reduce the incentives for this kind of behavior.  Joskow and Tirole (2000) show how 
generators’ holdings of transmission contracts affect their behavior, and that these can worsen 
market power.  For example, a generator in an importing region could hold transmission 
contracts that increase its exposure to the local price, enhancing its incentive to raise that 
price.  Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (2004) show that the impact of  transmission contracts 
depends on the design of the markets in which they are traded – generators will not obtain 
contracts that worsen their market power in a uniform price auction, but may do so in a 
discriminatory auction, for example.  Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2003) simulate the market in 
Belgium and the Netherlands and obtain lower prices when the markets are integrated than 
when rights to use the cross-border interconnectors are traded before the energy markets open.  
 This paper does not examine the impact of contracts, but does allow the two largest 
generators to act strategically.  One of these generators sometimes reduces output to create an 
import constraint into an area where it owns most of the local generation, allowing it to raise 
prices well above their level in the rest of the country.  Under one pricing rule, it also tries to 
raise its output in a second area, which is subject to an export constraint, in order to increase 
the compensation that it obtains for reducing output back to the feasible level.      
  
 
6 
 The next section of the paper gives a brief outline of the theory of transmission 
pricing.  Section 3 describes the model.  Section 4 describes the three pricing rules that are 
compared.  Section 5 shows how welfare changes with these rules.  Welfare is highest when 
the model is solved with optimal prices (one for each node), and lowest with one uniform 
price for demand and one for generation.  The uniform-price system is based upon that used 
in the Electricity Pool of England and Wales from 1990 to 2001, and very similar to the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) which followed it.  Initial trading took place 
without regard to transmission constraints, and when generators were made to change their 
outputs in order to ensure a feasible dispatch, they were compensated for the opportunity 
costs of doing so.3  Since political considerations sometimes dictate that consumers should 
face a uniform price, even if locational pricing would be acceptable for generators, the model 
is also solved with varying prices for generators, but a uniform price (in each time period) for 
demand.  Section 6 considers the impact of market power.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION PRICING 
The theory of spot pricing is set in detail out by Schweppe et al (1988).  The interested reader 
should refer to that book, or the shorter exposition given by Hsu (1997) for details, for this 
                                                          
3 The Pool provided this compensation through an algorithm that calculated payments for generators that 
changed their output relative to the original schedule.  Under NETA, the system operator trades with the 
generators to ensure feasibility, but if the market is competitive, the prices for these trades will be opportunity 
costs.  A referee has pointed out that the system operator could go further than simply creating a feasible 
dispatch, buying output from well-placed generators and selling power back to those in areas with high marginal 
transmission costs, until it achieves the same dispatch as with a locational pricing system.  This is correct in 
theory, but many market participants would regard it as unacceptable in practice, given a long history of 
opposition to either locational pricing or energy trading on the part of the National Grid Company.   
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section will merely state their key formula for the spot price at any point on a network, and 
concentrate on giving the underlying intuition for it. 
 The optimal prices for electricity transmission can be seen as arising from the problem 
of maximizing the net welfare obtained from electricity consumption, subject to a number of 
constraints.   This net welfare is equal to the benefit from consuming electricity, less the cost 
of generating it.  For simplicity, we will ignore any variable costs which are not manifested in 
a need for increased generation.4  The constraints to be met are that total generation must 
equal total demand, plus losses, and that the flow along each transmission line must be less 
than the capacity of that line. The flows depend on the levels of generation and demand at 
each node.  For practical applications, they are derived from a load flow model such as the 
DC load flow model, which is outlined below.  We can write a simplified version of the 
problem: 
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where dk represents the demand at node k, gj represents the generation at node j, and losses in 
transmission are equal to l.  The maximum flow allowed on line i is given by zi
max .  In the DC 
load flow model, the flow on line i is the sum over all the nodes of the products of the net 
export at each node and the power transfer distribution factor for that node and that line, φij. 
The Lagrangean multiplier on the energy balance constraint is µ e , while the multiplier on the 
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flow constraint for line i is µ iQS .  The first-order conditions to this problem can be 
manipulated to give the price at node k: 
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The multiplier on the energy balance constraint can be interpreted as the marginal cost of 
generation at the “swing bus”, the location of the marginal generator - this would be the cost 
of providing another unit of electricity in a system unaffected by losses or constraints.  In 
practice, however, some electricity is lost in transmission, and so more or less than 1 MW 
will have to be generated in order to deliver 1 MW.  If an increase in demand at node k leads 
to an increase in flows, losses will increase.  Taking the simplest possible example, of a two-
node system (figure 1), we might have: 
 
Figure 1: A Two Node network 
 Generation - 105 MW Demand - 100 MW 
 
 
The average loss on this line is 5% of the power delivered, but the loss is proportional to the 
flow squared, and so the marginal loss will be 10%, twice the average.  If the marginal cost of 
generation (which should be the price at the generation node) is £20/MWh, then the price at 
the demand node should be £22/MWh.  It is possible for an increase in demand to reduce 
system losses, however, if it reduces the flows along some lines.  In the example below 
(figure 2), 100 MW of demand at the left-hand node is met by an extra 100 MW of generation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4   In other words, we assume that the cost of transmission maintenance, for example, does not depend on the 
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at the central node, and the flow along the left-hand line decreases.  The price at the left-hand 
node should be less than at the central node, reflecting this. 
 
Figure 2: A Three Node Network 
 
 200 MW G 
Swing bus 
400 MW D 200 MW  G 
 
200 MW 400 MW 
300 MW G 
Swing bus 
400 MW D 200 MW  G 
100 MW  D 
100 MW 400 MW 
 
 
The final term in equation (2) concerns the cost of constraints.  Returning to the two-node 
network, if the line between the nodes was operating at its maximum capacity, then any 
further demand at the right-hand node would have to be met by generation at that node.  If the 
marginal cost of generation at that node was £30/MWh, this should be the price of electricity 
at that node.  A 1 MW increase in the capacity of the link would allow another MW of power 
to be delivered from the left-hand node at a cost of £22/MWh, so that the shadow price of the 
constraint is £8/MWh.  Each 1 MW increase in demand causes a 1 MW increase in the flow 
across the constrained link, and so the power transfer distribution factor φik would equal –1 in 
this example.  In this simple example, the price at each node is equal to the marginal cost of 
the generation at that node, and the price equation is basically a way of decomposing the 
difference between them into the cost of losses and the cost of the constraint. 
 To solve more complicated examples, we must be able to derive the power flows in a 
“meshed” network, in which there is more than one route between some pairs of points.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
level of power flows.  
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DC Load Flow model used in this paper is an approximation, but a reasonable one for our 
purposes.  The model is discussed in the appendix, but the key equation is  
( )z R A A R A yT= − − −1 1 1       (3) 
where z is the vector of power flows along the L lines and y is the vector of net injections at 
the N-1 nodes excluding the swing bus.  R is an L×L diagonal matrix of the resistances (or 
strictly speaking, impedances) on each line, and A an L×N-1 matrix showing the connections 
between lines and nodes, known as the network incidence matrix.  The key results from the 
model (or any other realistic model of line flows) are that power flows between two nodes 
will be shared among all the lines connecting those nodes, directly or indirectly, but that the 
distribution of the flow between any two routes will be inversely proportional to the relative 
resistance of those routes. 
 In the example below (figure 3), in which all three lines have the same resistance, 
two-thirds of the power generated at node A will flow through line 1, and one-third through 
lines 2 and 3.  Two-thirds of the power generated at node B will flow through line 3, and one-
third through lines 1 and 2.  Since flows on line 2 are defined to be from A to B, (as shown by 
the arrow) the output from B which is flowing towards A will actually be measured as a 
negative flow (or, equivalently, a reduction in the flow from A to B). 
 
Figure 3: A Three Node Meshed Network 
 
 node B -  
£30/MWh 
 node C -  
demand 
 node A -  
£20/MWh 
Line 1 Line 2 
Line 3 
   1/3          2/3 
 1/3  
 
 2/3 
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Assume that there are no losses, to keep the example straightforward.  If there were no 
constraints, and sufficient capacity at node A, the price of electricity would be £20/MWh at 
all three nodes.  If there is a binding transmission constraint on line 1, however, then a 1 MW 
increase in demand at node C can only be met by reducing generation at A by 1 MW, and 
increasing generation at B by 2 MW.  The additional output from B would cause ⅔MW to 
flow through line 1 (⅓ of the extra output), but the reduction in output from A would 
decrease the flow along the congested line by ⅔MW.  The marginal cost of meeting the 
demand is £40/MWh - (2 MWh from B at £30 each, but saving 1 MWh from A which would 
have cost £20).5  This example shows that the cost of delivering 1 MW to some points on the 
network could be greater than the marginal cost of generation at any individual node - other 
examples could be constructed in which the delivered cost of power is negative.  Since 
dealing properly with constraints can produce such strong price signals, studying the cost of 
ignoring them should be a worthwhile project. 
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
This paper studies the impact of different transmission pricing schemes on a simple model, 
but one which represents the main flows over the national grid system in England and Wales.  
                                                          
5 This price (£40/MWh) could also be decomposed as in equation (2).  The marginal cost at node A is 
£20/MWh, which is equal to µ e .  Adding 1 MW of capacity to line 1 would allow us to replace 3 MWh of 
generation at B (costing £90) with 3 MWh of generation at A (costing £60), a saving of £30, giving us the value 
of µ i
QS .  (The reduction at B reduces the flow on line 1 by 1 MW, which allows half of the increase caused by 
the extra generation at A - the other half comes from the new capacity).  Increasing demand at C by 1 MW will 
increase the flow on line 1 by ⅔MW.  We get £40 = £20 + £30 × ⅔.   
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That system has 14,000 km of 275 kV and 400 kV transmission lines, in 400 circuits which 
connect 200 substations.  The (winter) peak demand on the system is presently around 50 
GW.  The main power flows are from power stations in the north of England and the 
Midlands to the south, although there are several large power stations in the south-east, near 
the Thames Estuary. 
 The National Grid Company (NGC) has divided its system into a number of zones for 
charging generators: the boundaries of the zones generally coincide with groups of circuits 
which are heavily loaded and might be constrained under some operating conditions.  Our 
model is based upon the zones used in the mid-1990s, and uses one node to represent each 
zone.  The exceptions are that the northernmost zone is split into two, and that two southern 
zones with no generation are combined with their neighbors.  Twenty-one lines link our 
thirteen nodes, so that all zones which were directly connected are linked. 
 The model is based upon projections for the summer and winter of 1996/97, made by 
NGC in April 1996.  The company publishes a seven-year projection of demand and capacity 
each year, together with data on the transmission system.  Table 1 shows the distribution of 
generation and demand at the winter peak in 1996/7, together with demand at the summer 
peak.  Generation in zones 0 and 1 includes 0.6 GW of imports from Scotland in each zone, 
while generation in zone 9 includes 2 GW of imports from France.  The table also gives 
NGC’s zonal predictions of the marginal losses from extra generation in 2002/3 (the only year 
for which the figures were given): these were used as a guide when calibrating the model, 
although it was not possible to replicate them exactly. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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 Table 2 gives more information on the generation which is located at each node.  Two 
types are identified: must-run and variable.  Both nuclear and combined-cycle gas turbine 
stations are classed as must-run plants, 
submitting very low bids and running as often 
as they are available.  This reflects the way in 
which the earlier gas turbine stations were bid 
into the Pool, partly determined by their 
contracts; later stations have been more 
flexible.  The variable stations are assumed to 
have a linear marginal cost function: the most 
expensive capacity has a marginal cost of £60/MWh.6  Figure 4 shows the assumed marginal 
cost function for zone 9. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 This form of marginal cost function is a simplification, because the marginal cost 
function for any one power station would be roughly horizontal, while a node with several 
stations would have a step function.  This would imply that small changes in prices would 
frequently have no effect on the pattern of generation, but that a change would occasionally 
have a discontinuous impact as one station became cheaper than another.7  In the presence of 
                                                          
6   At low levels of demand, the marginal cost of output is reduced by the benefit of avoiding shut-downs and 
subsequent start-up costs, while start-up costs raise marginal costs above “steady state” running costs.  The range 
of marginal costs shown here is therefore greater than the range of steady state costs.  
7   This could lead to further complications, if the new distribution of generation affected power flows and the 
associated prices.  In practice, the price at each of several nodes might be set to equal the marginal cost of a 
Generation in Zone 9
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Figure 4: Generation Marginal Costs  
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discontinuities, the cost of a distortion may be very sensitive to the size of that distortion, 
since small distortions will be costless.  Our formulation gives more opportunities for 
adjusting generation in response to prices.  Generation availability was de-rated to 90% of the 
raw figure in winter, and 70% in summer, to reflect outages for maintenance (mostly forced in 
winter, with planned maintenance concentrated in the summer). 
 Demand is price sensitive, with a constant elasticity of -0.15 at each node, 
representing a “medium-term”, rather than a “short-term”, response.  This is the elasticity 
with respect to the price of generation: the implied elasticity with respect to the final price 
will be approximately double this.  The resulting elasticity of -0.3 is the one used by the 
regulator in appraising the impact of its policies (Ofgem, 2003), and other values are used for 
sensitivity tests later.  There are ten sets of demand curves in each season, representing 
different load levels.  Each set is obtained by scaling down the regional peak demands by a 
common factor, chosen to match points on the seasonal load-duration curve.8  The demand 
curves are anchored so that these quantities are demanded at the (uniform national) prices 
which the Pool pricing system, as used in the 1990s, would have produced.  Figure 5 shows 
how the network of lines links the thirteen nodes in the model.  With two exceptions, 
electricity flows from a lower to a higher numbered zone: the reverse flows are from zone 1 
(the western half of NGC’s zone 1) to zone 0, and from zone 12 to zone 10. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
station at that node, and the output from each station would then have to be adjusted until the resulting power 
flows meant that the selected prices were the correct spot prices, given the power flows.  
8 For example, the winter peak demands are created by scaling the peak demand by 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.76, .073, 
0.71, 0.68, 0.64, 0.6 and 0.54.  In practice, the figures in table 1 were first reduced by 1.8% to take account of 
transmission losses, which are not separately identified in this table of the NGC source document. 
  
 
15 
 
 Table 3 describes the lines which link these zones: the resistances have been chosen 
so that the flows between zones, and the marginal losses incurred on demand in each zone, 
are close to those given in NGC (1996).  These losses are only published for the final year of 
the projection, and so the network model was initially calibrated for 2002/3, using demand 
and generation figures for that year.  One adjustment was then made to represent the system 
in 1996/7.  NGC planned to double the capacity of the lines between zone 1 and zone 2 
before2002, and so the resistance between those zones was doubled to reflect the state of the 
system before this investment.9 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 The transmission system in England and Wales suffers from a number of constraints.  
Some of these are local and cannot be modeled at the lower level of detail in this paper: a 
particular station is required to run to make the adjoining lower-voltage system more reliable.  
Other constraints relate to the flows across a number of heavily loaded boundaries: although 
NGC uses a different methodology to define its charging zones, their boundaries generally 
coincide with some of these critical system boundaries.  Constraints may be caused by 
thermal limits on the amount of active power that can flow through a line, or by voltage limits 
that also depend on reactive power flows.  NGC reports the main boundary limits in terms of 
                                                          
9 This paper is slightly unconventional in using a DC model, which generally assumes no losses, to estimate the 
power flows, and then estimating losses on the basis of these flows, but its aim is to consider both constraints and 
losses within a tractable approximation of reality. 
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active power flows.  Table 4 shows these constrained circuits and their maximum ratings.10    
Since the DC load flow model used in this paper does not include reactive power, it is 
possible that the extent of constraints is under-estimated, should there be times when reactive 
power flows are high relative to active flows.  While constraints 2 and 12 were occasionally 
binding, with small impacts on prices, the most important constraints for our purposes were 
numbers 1 and 6.  Constraint 1 separates the North from the rest of the market, while 
constraint 6 isolates the South of Wales and the South-West of England.  These two 
constraints are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 This small-scale model cannot be a fully accurate representation of the NGC system, 
but it will behave in similar ways in response to small changes in generation or demand.  The 
aim of this paper is to consider whether different transmission pricing systems are likely to 
have an important practical impact on the electricity industry.  This is a wider question than 
calculating prices in particular locations at particular times, although we need to do that 
before we can come to an answer.  To answer the wider question, however, we do not need an 
exact representation of any one system, as long as our model incorporates the kind of 
responses which would be found in a real system. 
 
 
                                                          
10 The boundary ratings are set so that the system can absorb the loss of any circuit without overloading the 
remaining lines.  It is usual for a few lines to be unavailable, reducing the system’s capacity to take further 
outages, and hence the safe boundary flows.  Circuit ratings were accordingly reduced (by more in summer than 
winter) to raise constraint costs to the level seen in the mid-1990s.  
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4. THE PRICING RULES 
The model was solved for a range of demand levels under “summer” and “winter” conditions 
(plant and transmission availability), and the results aggregated to give figures for the year as 
a whole.  Three pricing rules were used.  The first was optimal pricing: a single price at each 
node, for both generation and demand.  The second pricing rule had separate prices at each 
node for generation, but a uniform national price for demand.  The third pricing rule is 
effectively that used in England and Wales from 1990 to the present day: one national price 
for generation, and one price for demand.  Under the Pool, this was achieved through the 
market rules, and while it is not imposed by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements, we 
should expect all traders to come close to achieving the best price possible, and hence to 
uniformity, if the market is efficient.  
 If there are constraints, however, the generators’ responses to the national prices 
would be infeasible, and “counter-trading” was used to manage constraints.  Generation was 
reduced at nodes on the “export” side of a constraint, and increased at the others, in 
proportion to the amount of “variable” capacity at each node, reducing the flows to acceptable 
levels.  While normal generation is paid for at the national price, constrained on generation is 
paid its cost (higher than the national price).  Generation which is constrained off is also sold 
back to the generator at cost, (it must be sold back, since it had already been “paid for” under 
the rules used in England and Wales, both with the Pool and with NETA).  If the generator 
had been bidding its marginal cost, it would neither gain nor lose from this transaction.  If 
necessary, “must-run” generation could also be reduced to ensure that net exports from a node 
were within acceptable limits.  (Similar reductions were sometimes needed with the second 
pricing rule, in cases when net exports were excessive, even with a local generation price of 
zero.)  We will continue to use gj(pj) to represent the generation that would be offered at node 
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j at a price of pj, and add cj for changes in output due to constraints.  The total output at node j 
is thus gj(pj) + cj. 
 The pricing rules can be related to the welfare problem stated in section II.  The first 
rule, optimal pricing, is simply the solution to equation (1).  The second rule is the solution to 
the closely related problem below.  The additional constraint relates to the “merchandising 
surplus” which the transmission company makes with the optimal pricing rule.  On average, 
demand exceeds generation at the higher-priced nodes, and the resulting surplus (R) can be 
put towards the fixed costs of the transmission network.  The remaining costs are recovered 
through (distorting) tariffs.  As long as the regulator takes the surplus from optimal pricing 
into account when setting limits on those tariffs, they will be lower than if all the costs of the 
transmission system had to be recovered through them.  In order to compare welfare on a like 
with like basis, we want the transmission company to have to recover the same amount of 
revenue from its main network tariffs (not modeled here) under each pricing rule.  Keeping 
the distortions from those tariffs constant should imply that the same adjustment would be 
made to each of the welfare calculations here, were we to take them into account.  If we 
required the transmission company to raise more money from its network tariffs when it does 
not adopt optimal pricing, but did not take this into account, we would be biasing our results 
against the optimal pricing rule.  For a sensitivity analysis, however, we run one simulation in 
which we set R to zero.   
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Applying the third pricing rule cannot be based on an optimization that maximizes welfare, 
since the solver would use counter-trading to equalize the marginal cost of generation in each 
zone, taking us back to the results of the second rule.11  Instead, the solver was instructed to 
balance generation and demand, earning the same transmission surplus as with optimal 
pricing, and counter-trading only where a constraint would otherwise be breached.  
Generation on the two sides of a constraint was increased or decreased in proportion to the 
amount of variable capacity.  In other words, if output had to be reduced by 0.4 GW to the 
                                                          
11 An anonymous referee suggested that NGC could do exactly this when balancing the system under NETA, 
since each station is paid its own offered price, and NGC is fully aware of every unit’s location and technical 
characteristics.  The company could scale every offer to take account of the unit’s marginal transmission losses 
and choose to accept the lowest scaled offers.  Furthermore, some spatial arbitrage, buying electricity in the 
south and selling back slightly more in the north, could be profitable even when there are no constraints.  NGC 
does not trade in this way, however.  It dispatches generators to meet a total generation requirement (the sum of 
demand plus losses) and calls bids and offers in price order without any adjustment, as long as the units are 
capable of responding in time and are in the right location relative to any constraints.  (Telephone conversation 
with NGC Wokingham, 3 January 2006.)  The algorithm used here captures the essentials of NGC’s behavior 
under both the Pool and NETA. 
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north of a constraint, and half of the variable generation to the north of that constraint was in 
a given zone, then output in that zone would be reduced by 0.2 GW.  In the absence of losses, 
this would minimize the cost of the adjustments, which is NGC’s objective.  The payment for 
the adjustment is equal to the production cost of the adjusted generation, less the production 
cost of the unadjusted generation.  The constraints to be met were thus: 
  
    ( ) ( ) 0losses =+−+ ∑∑
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(total transmission surplus equal to R) 
 
The two prices, pd for demand and pg for generation, and the constrained outputs in each 
zone, were adjusted to ensure that these constraints were met. 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 5 gives the results for our central case, with marginal cost bidding and a demand 
elasticity of 0.15 (relative to the wholesale price).  The average revenue is lowest, and the 
total output highest, with optimal pricing, while the Pool system of uniform pricing has the 
highest average revenue and lowest level of output.  Despite the lower levels of output, 
generation costs are higher with the two sub-optimal pricing systems.  Under the Pool system, 
it is possible to identify the cost of constraints, as represented by NGC’s counter-trading 
payments.  The other pricing systems do not allow us to calculate a similar figure, although 
the extent of constraints can be seen in the coefficient of variation in generation prices.  The 
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first row is based on calculating the coefficient of variation across the zones for each demand 
level, and then taking the average of these coefficients.  By construction, there is no variation 
under the Pool system, whereas the other two systems involve significant regional variations 
in prices.  Much of this variation comes from a binding export constraint covering the two 
northernmost zones, and the rest from transmission losses.  The variations (in the generators’ 
prices) are greater when consumers face a uniform price, as the only way to reduce net 
exports from the north is to reduce generation.  In many hours, the price has to drop to zero to 
achieve this.  When the consumers’ price varies as well, the reduction increases demand, 
reducing net exports and allowing equilibrium to be reached at a higher price.  The second set 
of coefficients of variation shows that there is significant variation over time as well.    
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 Welfare, defined as the un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits, is £93 
million per year lower with a uniform price for demand than with optimal pricing.  This is 
equal to 1.2% of the revenue from optimal pricing.  With uniform prices for both generation 
and demand, welfare is lower by £100 million, or 1.3% of the revenue from optimal pricing.  
This implies that most of the gains from spatially differentiated transmission prices come 
from the demand side, at least in this market at this time.  On the generation side, 
transmission constraints have to be respected by the final pattern of outputs, whatever the 
pricing system.  Furthermore, the adjustments made for transmission constraints have the 
side-effect of reducing losses, since the generators subject to the northern export constraint 
have the highest marginal transmission losses.  For these reasons, changing the pricing rule 
for generators has little impact on the production cost of electricity.  Changing the pricing rule 
for consumers, however, reduces demand in areas where the price would have been above 
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marginal cost, and increases demand where the price was below marginal cost, allowing 
much larger welfare gains.  
 The welfare gains are not uniformly distributed.  Generators are (collectively) worse 
off when consumers (only) pay a uniform price, in part because the northern export constraint 
means that some generation is bought at a very low price – the demand response under 
optimal pricing allows a higher price in this area.  Northern consumers similarly lose from the 
move to a uniform price, and while other consumers see lower prices, consumer surplus falls 
overall.  When both consumers and generators face uniform prices, however, generators are 
better off than with optimal pricing.  One reason for this is that generators in export-
constrained areas are paid the national price for the output that they do sell (instead of a lower 
zonal price), and receive “lost profit” payments for the output that is constrained off (they sell 
it at the national price and buy it back at their marginal production cost).  The average 
revenue is higher, and consumers are worse off.  
 Table 6 and table 7 present results using two other values of the demand elasticity, as 
a sensitivity analysis. With a lower elasticity of –0.05, the optimal prices vary more, as 
demand is less responsive to changes in price.  (When the price to consumers is uniform, 
however, the spatial variation of generation prices is very insensitive to the demand 
elasticity.)  Although the efficient level of price variation is greater, the welfare impact of 
moving away from this system is smaller, as moving to a uniform price for demand reduces 
welfare by 0.9% of revenue.  Adopting a uniform price for generation as well reduces welfare 
by a further £6 million a year, almost identical to the figure for the middle elasticity case.  
With uniform prices for demand alone, consumers collectively lose by more and generators 
by less than in the base case.  With uniform prices for demand and for generation, the welfare 
effects for both groups are larger than in the base case. 
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Table 6 about here 
 
 With a higher elasticity of -0.25, the optimal spatial variation in prices falls, and the 
welfare loss from the other pricing rules increases.  A uniform price for demand alone reduces 
welfare by 1.4% of the wholesale market revenues with optimal pricing, and imposing a 
uniform price for generation costs a further £7 million a year.  The impact of the generators’ 
pricing rule therefore seems not to vary with the demand elasticity, whereas the consumers’ 
pricing rule has an impact which is non-linear in the elasticity.  Collectively, consumers are 
slightly better off if they (only) face uniform prices, while generators suffer more from the 
change than in the base case.  With two uniform prices, however, the collective welfare 
impacts are in the same direction as in the base case, but smaller. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
 The simulations for the two non-optimal rules assume that the demand prices have to 
raise the same amount of revenue for the transmission company as the merchandising surplus 
that it automatically obtains from optimal pricing.  This is on the assumption that the surplus 
would be used to reduce the transmission company’s other charges, and that if this money 
was not available, it would have to be raised from some other, distorting, charge.  An 
alternative assumption is that the surplus would simply raise the transmission company’s 
profits, and that a better counter-factual would not require the company to make any surplus 
with the two non-optimal rules.  Using the base case elasticity, this would reduce the average 
revenue by around £0.7/MWh, and increase consumers’ surplus by about £200 million a year.  
Overall welfare, however, would rise by just £0.3 million with one uniform price (comparing 
that pricing system with and without the need to recover this surplus), and £1.3 million with 
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two.  This is trivial in comparison with the welfare losses caused by shifting away from 
optimal pricing.  
 
 
6. MARKET POWER 
It is well-known that electricity markets are vulnerable to market power.  Does the choice of 
transmission pricing system affect this vulnerability?  A full-blown simulation of an 
oligopolistic market is beyond the scope of this paper, but this section investigates the impact 
of abusive behaviour by the two largest companies in the market.  In 1996/7, National Power 
and PowerGen each owned about one quarter of the industry’s capacity, as shown in table 8.  
While the rest of the industry continues to bid at marginal cost, we will allow these generators 
to vary the slope of the bid functions that they submit for their “variable” capacity.  The 
market operator will follow the same pricing rules as before, treating these submitted bid 
functions as true measures of the companies’ costs – the correct (original) cost functions will 
of course be used when calculating the actual level of welfare. 
 
Table 8 around here 
 
 A grid search was used to find the generators’ profit-maximizing strategies.  In 
general, the companies did not gain significantly from using different mark-ups in different 
zones, and so common mark-ups were used for all of PowerGen’s stations.  National Power, 
however, has a high proportion of the capacity in two regions that might be the subject of 
transmission constraints.  Zone 1, in the north-east, was always export-constrained, implying 
relatively low prices, while an import constraint could be created in zones 8, 12, and 13.  
National Power owned all the variable capacity in these south-western zones, and by 
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submitting high bids at times of peak demand, could ensure that some of it had to be used, 
despite the high prices.  To give the company the chance to exploit these concentrations of 
plant, it was allowed to submit a different mark-up for plant in zone 1, and in zones 8 and 12.  
The regulator had investigated the generators’ behavior when bidding stations likely to be 
constrained on, however, and had severely criticized some of the tactics used by PowerGen 
(Offer, 1992), without taking action at that time.  To reflect the risk of provoking regulatory 
action, National Power’s bids were restricted to be no more than ten times its true costs.   
 In the northern zone, the uniform pricing rule gives National Power the opportunity to 
play what has become known as the “DEC game”, following from its abuse in California.  If 
the company submits low bids for stations located behind an export constraint, they will be 
scheduled to run, earning the uniform national price.  This output cannot be accommodated, 
however, and the system controller has to sell it back to the company.  Under the Pool rules 
used in this simulation, the price is the company’s own bid, which might be close to zero but 
would have to be positive – other market rules might allow the company to demand payment 
for not generating.  In California, there were occasional doubts whether the power scheduled 
in a DEC game could have been generated, but in this simulation, the amounts involved were 
limited to the generator’s capacity in the export-constrained zone. 
 Table 9 shows the results.  Prices are, unsurprisingly, higher and quantities lower.  
The variation of prices over space does not increase by much, but their variation over time 
does – the peak prices are relatively much higher in the presence of market power.  The 
highest average prices come when there is a uniform price for demand, but zonal prices for 
generation.  This is due to the way in which transmission constraints interact with market 
power.  National Power can create an import constraint into the South-West at peak times, 
and receive a higher price for all the generation it has in this zone.  With optimal pricing, the 
full impact of this price increase is felt by the local demand, which will fall.  With a uniform 
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price for demand, the demand-side impact of a higher generation price on one side of a 
constraint is spread over the entire market.  This effectively makes the local demand less 
elastic, which would raise the profit-maximizing price, considering the area in isolation.  The 
corollary, however, is that raising the price in one area will reduce generators’ profits in the 
rest of the country, since the demand price will rise and sales will fall.  Power flows cannot 
change to offset these effects, since the boundaries are already constrained.   
 
Table 9 about here 
 
 If the generators’ capacity was evenly distributed across the country, the distinction 
between zonal and uniform pricing might well be unimportant, for the greater gains inside a 
constraint would be offset by the effects outside it.  In practice, however, National Power has 
such a high proportion of the capacity to the South-West of boundary 6 that with uniform 
demand pricing, the company finds it profitable to create the constraint for the two highest 
winter demand levels.  With optimal pricing, creating the constraint is only profitable for the 
highest demand level.  PowerGen has no plant in either the North or the South-West, and 
similarly gains more from raising the generation price in the central zone when there is a 
uniform demand price, since the part of the response that comes on the other side of the two 
constraints has no impact on its profits.   
 With uniform pricing for both generation and demand, we get an intermediate average 
price, even though this rule gave the highest prices in the absence of market power.  The price 
received for most generation is not affected by transmission constraints, which reduces the 
incentive to exploit them and their impact on the demand price – only the incremental output 
receives a higher price.  A lower demand price at the very peak period is responsible for much 
of the difference in average revenue between the two pricing rules.  In the North, National 
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Power can exploit the export constraint by playing the DEC game – it bids all its capacity at 
close to zero, which is therefore scheduled to run, and receives the difference between the 
market price and this bid in return for not running it.  This strategy will tend to reduce the 
price received for generation, even though the constrained-off payments will raise the margin 
between the generation price and the price paid by demand.  Collectively, the generators’ 
profits are lowest with this pricing rule, but National Power makes almost the same profits as 
with optimal pricing, implying that it is playing the DEC game at the expense of the other 
generators.  Note that the profits shown in table 9 are variable profits, before deducting any 
fixed costs. 
 The welfare difference between optimal pricing and a uniform price for demand has 
now doubled, while the additional impact of a uniform price for generation has risen ten-fold.  
Taking market power as a given, adopting a uniform price for demand is bad for consumers 
and good for generators, who can exploit constraints more effectively, as described above.  
Using two uniform prices is worse than optimal pricing for both generators and consumers, 
although consumers do better than if they alone face a uniform price. 
 The bottom part of table 9 compares the impact of market power under the different 
pricing rules.  Welfare is reduced by between £424 million and £569 million, or by between 
5.4% and 7.2% of the industry’s revenues under optimal pricing and perfect competition.  The 
smallest loss comes with optimal pricing, and the greatest with two uniform prices.  
Consumer welfare falls by around £5 billion, and generators’ profits rise by more than £4 
billion.  The change in consumer welfare from market power is least with two uniform prices 
and biggest with a uniform price for demand alone, but consumers still achieve their highest 
level of welfare (for the base elasticity) with optimal pricing, whether or not there is market 
power.  
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 To conclude this section, it is worth pointing out that the market in England and 
Wales has become significantly more competitive since 1996/7, and so the impact of market 
power would be much smaller today.  Even in 1996/7, our simulations have slightly over-
stated the impact of market power, by allowing the generators to choose different mark-ups 
for each level of demand.  In practice, their bids had to last for a whole day, reducing their 
ability to exploit transmission constraints of shorter durations – a bid that would be profitable 
while the constraint lasted might lose money over the day as a whole.  Under NETA, 
however, generators can change their bids in every trading period, potentially increasing their 
ability to exploit transmission constraints. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has illustrated the benefits of applying optimal spot prices in a simple model of an 
electricity network based on England and Wales in 1996/97.  Looking at operating costs 
alone, and taking nodal spot pricing as the optimum, welfare would fall by 1.2% of wholesale 
revenues if a uniform demand price were applied, and by slightly more if uniform prices for 
both demand and generation were adopted.  In the presence of market power, the cost of sub-
optimal pricing rises to 2.3% and 3.1% of revenues, respectively.  These may seem like small 
numbers, but they can be compared to Newbery and Pollitt’s (1997) estimate of the net 
benefits from privatizing the Central Electricity Generating Board, which was equal to 5% of 
the Board’s costs.  “Throwing away” a quarter or more of the benefits of that exercise might 
sound rather more significant.   
 It must be remembered, however, that introducing optimal prices will often involve 
transfers between agents that are much greater than the net welfare gain.  That is likely to 
make them hard to introduce from a political point of view.  The attempt to introduce 
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transmission loss factors in Great Britain, which would reduce prices in the north, and 
increase them in the south, is a good example of this.  The resulting prices would provide 
better economic signals than the present system, and the issue was identified as one for future 
review when the market was first restructured, in 1990.  Companies which stood to lose from 
the change used the industry’s processes (including two unsuccessful appeals to the regulator) 
and legal action to stop it.  Changes to the market’s governance when the New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements were introduced allowed the regulator to press ahead with the change 
in England and Wales, but when the government extended the market to Scotland, it over-
ruled the regulator and decreed that prices would continue to be uniform.   
 The gains from optimal prices will be greater once we consider their effect as 
investment signals to generators.12  In the short term, moving towards optimal prices 
increases the output from stations in “good” locations, but since all the stations with low 
operating costs would have been dispatched under uniform pricing in any case, the stations 
where output rises must have relatively high operating costs, which limits the gain.  Consider 
a long, heavily loaded line with a station at each end, and marginal transmission losses of 
10%.  If the marginal costs of the station at the “right” end of the line are 5% higher than at 
the other station, the saving from reallocating generation between the stations is only 5%. 
When considering investment, however, we can save the full 10% by placing the new station 
at the right end of the line, and the saving applies to capital as well as operating costs.   
 We have assumed that the system can be successfully dispatched without the use of 
optimal prices, and thus ignored the issue of bypass.  When prices are not equal to marginal 
costs, some agents may wish to leave the main market and deal independently, reducing its 
efficiency.  Hogan (1998) describes a failed experiment in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
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Maryland (PJM) Interconnection in 1997.  Customers faced a price based on an unconstrained 
system, but transmission constraints meant that some generators were forced not to run.  They 
received no compensation for this, and had a strong incentive to arrange a bilateral transaction 
with a customer at a price between their marginal cost and the unconstrained price.  Once 
these generators had done so, their output could not be reduced, and the system operator had 
to constrain some other generators instead.  These then had an incentive to act in the same 
way, and the system operator was forced to ban bilateral trading before it ran out of 
dispatchable generation.  A revised market mechanism uses spot prices, and is not threatened 
by bilateral trading.  Hogan argues that any move to use zonal prices instead of nodal spot 
prices would create similar perverse incentives if used as a means of system co-ordination, 
and would be unlikely to simplify the calculation or interpretation of those prices.  
 One way to get round the problem of bypass is to ban bilateral trading from the start, 
as was done in England and Wales under the Pool system.  Another is to arrange 
compensation payments for constrained generators, funded by all consumers, so that no-one 
has an incentive to leave the market, but this reduces the incentive to avoid congested 
locations.  There are ways to make an electricity market work without nodal spot pricing.   
 The important question is whether nodal spot pricing would make the market work 
better.  This paper estimates that moving from uniform pricing to nodal pricing could have 
raised welfare by 1.3% of the generators’ revenues in a particular competitive market, and 
would be less vulnerable to the exercise of market power than alternative pricing systems.  
They would also improve the investment signals sent to generators.  The size of the gains is 
almost certainly market-specific, and other studies would be needed to calculate the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Spot prices are not the only way to send investment signals, however.  In England and Wales, the National 
Grid Company has regionally differentiated capacity-based charges, encouraging investment in the south. 
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changing the pricing rule in other markets.  Nothing in this study, however, suggests that 
gains would not exist elsewhere.  They are worth pursuing. 
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Appendix:  The DC Load Flow Model. 
 
The DC Load flow equations are a simple planning tool which may be used to provide an 
approximate relationship between generation and demand at each point on a network, and the 
power flows along each line.  They depend upon a number of approximations which make them 
inadequate for detailed system planning, but should be adequate to illustrate the possibilities of 
unit transmission charges.  The full equations are derived in appendix D of Schweppe et al, 
(1988); this appendix presents only their most simple form. 
 The network consists of N nodes which are linked by L lines.  The net power injection 
(generation minus demand) at node j is denoted by yj.  The sum of the net injections must equal 
the transmission losses (l) on the system, under the energy balance constraint.  In the DC 
equations, this means that one of the nodes is not explicitly modeled, and its net injection is 
effectively treated as a residual, determined by this constraint.  The other N-1 injections form a 
vector y.  The flow along line i is denoted by zi, and z is the N-vector of these flows.  The 
network incidence matrix, Ã, shows which buses are connected by each line.  A simple example 
is given below, in which all power is assumed to flow from the lower to the higher numbered 
node.  The node from which power flows is given an entry of +1, and the node to which power 
flows is given an entry of -1.  If the power actually flows in the opposite direction to that 
assumed, then zi will be negative.  Because Ã is singular, we remove the column corresponding 
to the swing bus to create a non-singular N  * (N  - 1) matrix A.  In this example, node number 2 
is the swing bus, and so we delete the second column of Ã to create A.  
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R is a N×N diagonal matrix, with the resistance of line i as the ii-th element, and zeros 
elsewhere.  The three DC load flow equations are: 
( )z R A A R A yT= − − −1 1 1    (line flow equation)   
                            l z R zT=                                             (transmission losses) 
                                 y lj
j
N
=
∑ − =
1
0                                 (energy balance constraint)     
The energy balance constraint has been written to ensure that a given set of N net injections are 
consistent.  An alternative is to rewrite the equation with the injection at the swing bus on the 
left hand side, solving for this as the residual from N-1 predetermined injections.  This 
effectively assumes that the marginal generator will be located at the swing bus.  In practice, the 
merit order determines the location of the marginal generator, which is unlikely to be at a pre-
defined swing bus, and the energy balance constraint as written here is used to ensure that its 
output (a choice variable) is consistent with electrical equilibrium.  
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Table 1:  Zones, Generation and Demand (GW) 
Zone Name Generation Peak Demand Marginal  
  (Winter) (Winter)   (Summer)     Loss 
0 North [-Western] 0.6 0.3 0.2  
1 North [-Eastern] 4.3 2.4 1.7 + 5% 
2 Yorkshire 9.4 5.6 3.9 + 3% 
3 N Wales and W Lancs 7.8 4.2 3.0 + 3% 
4 E Lancashire 0.0 2.8 2.0 + 1% 
5 Nottinghamshire 4.1 0.5 0.4 + 1% 
6 West Midlands 4.5 7.0 4.9 - 1% 
7 East Anglia 3.0 4.8 3.3 - 3% 
8 West and Wales 3.8 4.5 3.2 - 6% 
9 [Thames] Estuary 8.5 2.5 1.8 - 5% 
10 London [Inner and Outer] 2.0 8.7 6.1 - 5% 
12 South Coast 0.5 3.8 2.6 - 9% 
13 Wessex and Peninsula 1.6 2.8 1.9 - 9% 
Source: NGC, (1996) 
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Table 2: Generation Capacity (GW) 
Zone  Name Must-run Variable Total  
0 North [Western] 0.6 0.0 0.6 
1 North [Eastern] 3.9 1.1 5.0 
2 Yorkshire 3.5 8.0 11.4 
3 N Wales and W Lancs 5.9 4.1 10.0 
4 E Lancashire 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5 Nottinghamshire 0.0 4.9 4.9 
6 West Midlands 0.2 5.2 5.4 
7 East Anglia 3.6 0.0 3.6 
8 West and Wales 1.1 3.5 4.6 
9 [Thames] Estuary 4.5 5.4 9.9 
10 London [Inner and Outer] 1.7 0.9 2.6 
12 South Coast 0.0 0.7 0.7 
13 Wessex and Peninsula 1.7 0.2 1.9 
  26.8 33.9 60.7 
Source: NGC (1996)  Figures do not sum to totals due to rounding  
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Table 3: Lines and Flows 
Line From Zone to Zone   Resistance (×1000)   Flow (GW) 
1 1 0 8.775 0.4 
2 1 2 9.000 2.5 
3 0 3 9.000 1.2 
4 3 4 2.025 2.9 
5 2 4 3.450 2.6 
6 2 5 2.250 5.1 
7 3 6 8.325 2.1 
8 4 6 4.500 2.6 
9 5 6 3.900 2.4 
10 5 7 2.250 7.5 
11 6 7 3.675 2.1 
12 6 8 9.075 2.5 
13 7 8 7.500 2.0 
14 7 10 8.625 4.7 
15 7 9 16.125 1.6 
16 9 10 4.875 3.0 
17 9 12 5.925 2.2 
18 12 10 8.250 0.2 
19 8 12 8.250 2.8 
20 8 13 32.250 0.8 
21 12 13 3.375 0.7 
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Table 4: Constraints on the NGC system 
Boundary Lines Zones affected  Max rating (GW) 
1 2,3 Exports from 0,1 2.1 
2 6,7,8 Exports from 0 – 4 9.2 
3 10,11,12 Exports from 0 – 6 11.0 
4 17,-18,19,20 Imports to 12,13 7.7 
5 3,5,6 Exports from 0,1,2 6.8 
6 12,13,17,-18 Imports to 8,12,13 7.8 
7 20,21 Imports to 13 4.0 
8 14,16,18 Imports to 10 10.5 
9 -15,16,17 Exports from 9 8.5 
10 1,2 Exports from 1 2.0 
11 7,8,9,-11,-12 Imports to 6 6.0 
12 3,5,9,10 Exports from 0,1,2,5 11.5 
Source: NGC (1996) 
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Table 5: Base case results 
Pricing System Optimal Zonal                    
(for Generators) 
Uniform 
Demand (TWh) 289.8 286.3 285.4 
Losses (TWh) 1.55 1.58 1.59 
Total Revenue (£m) 7872 7842 8050 
Average Revenue (£/MWh) 27.17 27.39 28.21 
Cost of counter-trading (£m)   142 
Coefficient of Variation of prices:     
Within hours 0.34 0.42 0.00 
Across and within hours 0.59 0.65 0.50 
Changes relative to optimal pricing: 
Welfare (£m)  -93 -100 
       (% of revenue)  -1.2% -1.3% 
Consumer surplus (£m)  -19 -265 
       (% of revenue)  -0.2% -3.4% 
Generator profit (£m)  -73 166 
       (% of revenue)  -0.9% 2.1% 
Cost of generation (£m)  44 13 
       (% of revenue)  0.6% 0.2% 
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Table 6: Low elasticity results 
Pricing System Optimal Zonal                    
(for Generators) 
Uniform 
Demand (TWh) 289.5 285.7 285.4 
Losses (TWh) 1.57 1.57 1.59 
Total Revenue (£m) 7815 7820 8099 
Average Revenue (£/MWh) 26.99 27.37 28.38 
Cost of counter-trading (£m)   142 
Coefficient of Variation of prices:     
Within hours 0.49 0.42 0.00 
Across and within hours 0.63 0.65 0.50 
Changes relative to optimal pricing: 
Welfare (£m)  -67 -73 
       (% of revenue)  -0.9% -0.9% 
Consumer surplus (£m)  -54 -349 
       (% of revenue)  -0.7% -4.5% 
Generator profit (£m)  -8 275 
       (% of revenue)  -0.1% 3.5% 
Cost of generation (£m)  18 8 
       (% of revenue)  0.2% 0.1% 
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Table 7: High elasticity results 
Pricing System Optimal Zonal                    
(for Generators) 
Uniform 
Demand (TWh) 289.9 286.9 285.6 
Losses (TWh) 1.53 1.58 1.59 
Total Revenue (£m) 7922 7871 8030 
Average Revenue (£/MWh) 27.32 27.43 28.12 
Cost of counter-trading (£m)   142 
Coefficient of Variation of prices:     
Within hours 0.28 0.42 0.00 
Across and within hours 0.56 0.66 0.50 
Changes relative to optimal pricing: 
Welfare (£m)  -111 -118 
       (% of revenue)  -1.4% -1.5% 
Consumer surplus (£m)  7 -207 
       (% of revenue)  0.1% -2.6% 
Generator profit (£m)  -117 89 
       (% of revenue)  -1.5% 1.1% 
Cost of generation (£m)  67 19 
       (% of revenue)  0.8% 0.2% 
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Table 8: Generation Capacity of National Power and PowerGen (GW) 
 
Zone  
 
Name 
National Power PowerGen Industry 
Total Must-run Variable Must-run Variable 
0 North [Western] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
1 North [Eastern] 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 
2 Yorkshire 0.7 5.9 0.9 2.0 11.3 
3 N Wales and W 
Lancs 
0.5 0.0 1.5 2.0 10.0 
4 E Lancashire 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5 Nottinghamshire 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.9 
6 West Midlands 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.0 5.6 
7 East Anglia 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 
8 West and Wales 0.7 3.5 0.0 0.0 4.6 
9 [Thames] Estuary 0.0 1.4 0.0 4.0 9.9 
10 London 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.1 2.6 
12 South Coast 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 
13 Wessex and 
Peninsula 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 
  2.6 13.7 3.2 12.2 60.7 
Source: NGC (1996)  Figures do not sum to totals due to rounding 
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Table 9: The impact of market power 
Pricing System Optimal Zonal                    
(for Generators) 
Uniform 
Demand (TWh) 272.9 267.9 269.5 
Losses (TWh) 1.47 1.52 1.59 
Total Revenue (£m) 12200 12565 12198 
National Power’s profit (£m) 1932 2074 1930 
PowerGen’s profit (£m) 2018 2097 1757 
Average Revenue (£/MWh) 44.70 46.90 45.25 
Cost of counter-trading (£m)   359 
Coefficient of Variation of prices:     
Within hours 0.36 0.43 0.00 
Across and within hours 0.85 0.94 0.75 
Changes relative to optimal pricing: 
Welfare (£m)  -182 -245 
       (% of revenue)  -2.3% -3.1% 
Consumer surplus (£m)  -517 -82 
       (% of revenue)  -6.6% -1.0% 
Generator profit (£m)  337 -162 
       (% of revenue)  4.3% -2.1% 
Cost of generation (£m)  30 160 
       (% of revenue)  0.4% 2.0% 
Changes relative to marginal cost bidding: 
Welfare (£m) -424 -512 -569 
Consumer surplus (£m) -5091 -5589 -4908 
Generator profit (£m) 4448 4858 4120 
Transmission surplus (£m) 219 219 219 
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